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1. INTRODUCTION 
Assume Peggy ("the prover") knows some information. For instance, this could 
be the proof of a theorem or the prime factorization of a large integer. Assume 
further that Peggy's information is verifiable, in the sense that there exists an 
efficient procedure capable of certifying its validity. In order to convince Vic ("the 
verifier") of this fact, Peggy could simply reveal the information to him so that he 
could perform the certifying procedure himself. This would be a maximum disclosure 
proof, since it results in Vic learning aU the information. He could therefore later 
show it to someone else and even claim it to have been his originaUy. 
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In this paper we give a general protocol for obtaining minimum disclosure proofs 
and several practical ways to implement it. This protocol allows Peggy to convince 
Vic, beyond any reasonable doubt, that she has information that would pass the 
certifying procedure, but in a way that does not help him determine this informa-
tion. For example, if Peggy's information is the proof of a theorem, Vic is left with 
the conviction that Peggy knows how to prove it, and hence that the theorem is 
true. However, Vic is not given even a clue as to how the proof might proceed 
(except perhaps for an upper limit on its length}. Although Peggy's original infor-
mation is verifiable, the conviction thus obtained by Vic may not be. In particular, 
conducting the protocol with Peggy need not (and in many cases will not) enable 
Vic to subsequently convince someone else. 
The notion of minimum disclosure proofs extends to the case of probabilistically 
uer~fiable information. Assume, for instance, that Peggy generates two integers that 
are almost certainly prime according to some probabilistic algorithm [Rl, SS]. She 
computes their product, makes it public, and then claims that she knows its prime 
factorization. Does she have verifiable information to support her claim, consider-
ing the fact that she does not have a definite proof that her factors are prime? In 
a case like this, even though the efficient certifying procedure for her information 
is probabilistic, it still makes sense for her to use a minimum disclosure proof to 
convince Vic that her claim is true. Our minimum disclosure proof techniques 
extend to the case of probabilistically verifiable information. 
At the heart of all our protocols is the notion of bit commitment, which allows 
Peggy to commit herself to the value of some bits in a way that prevents Vic from 
learning them without her help. Bit commitment is implemented through our main 
primitive, which we call for convenience the "blob." As this paper shows, the blob 
is a universal primitive for minimum disclosure. Each blob is used by Peggy as a 
commitment to either 0 or 1. For the sake of generality, we do not impose any 
restriction on the nature of blobs-they could be made out of fairy dust if this were 
useful. By "Peggy commits to a blob," we mean that Peggy has a blob "in mind" 
and that she does something that will force her to stick to this blob in the future. 
If the blob itself can be represented as a bit string-as in most practical 
cases-committing to a blob can be as simple as showing it in the clear. The 
abstract defining properties of blobs are as follows: 
(i) Peggy can commit to blobs: by committing to a blob, she is in effect 
committing to a bit. 
(ii) Peggy can open any blob she has committed to: she can convince Vic of 
the value of the bit she in effect committed to when she committed to the blob. 
Thus, there is no blob she is able to "open" both as 0 and as 1. 
(iii) Vic cannot learn anything about which way Peggy is able to open any 
unopened blob she has committed to. This remains true even after other blobs have 
been opened by Peggy. 
(iv) Blobs do not carry "side information": the blobs themselves as well as 
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the processes by which Peggy commits to and opens them are uncorrelated to any 
secret she wishes to keep from Vic. 
Consider the following illustrative implementation of a blob. When Peggy wishes 
to commit to a bit (property (i)), she writes it on the floor and, before allowing Vic 
to look, she covers it with opaque tape. Although Vic cannot tell which bit is 
hidden under the tape (property (iii)), Peggy can no longer change it. To "open the 
blob" (property (ii)), Peggy allows Vic to strip off the tape and look at the bit. 
Property (iv) is satisfied provided that the way in which the bit is written on the 
floor, the tape, and its placement are all uncorrelated to any secret Peggy wishes 
to keep from Vic. 
In the following sections, we assume that blobs are available and show how to 
use them to obtain general minimum disclosure protocols. Sections 2 and 3 deal 
with the case of deterministically verifiable information. After a complexity-theoretic 
interlude in Section 4, Section 5 gives the general protocol for probabilistically 
verifiable information. Under various assumptions, Section 6 describes several 
implementations for blobs and compares their relative strengths and weaknesses. As 
we shall see, some blob implementations lead to protocols that protect Peggy's 
information unconditionally but that would allow her to lie to Vic by breaking 
some cryptographic assumption in real time. One subtle point-not illustrated by 
the floor-and-tape example-is that it is not necessarily the case that each given 
blob must encode a unique bit; more generally, it is Peggy's knowledge about the 
blob that determines which bit is involved. Dual blob implementations are uncondi-
tionally secure for Vic, but could allow him to recover Peggy's information after 
some long (perhaps infeasible) off-line computation. Other implementations show 
neither weakness, but rely on dogmas of quantum physics or require the participa-
tion of several parties. The last section compares these possibilities. 
1.1. Related work 
As occurs often in research, some of the ideas presented here were developed 
independently in several places. An early interactive proof was presented by Rabin 
[R2]. This concept was formalized and the notion of "zero-knowledge" protocols 
(which is related to minimum disclosure) were introduced in [GMR]. Also, [Ba] 
formalized a notion similar to that of interactive proofs. The model proposed in 
[GMR, Ba] is quite interesting from a theoretical point of view, but it is based on 
the assumption that the prover has unlimited computing power. 
Assuming only the existence of secure probabilistic encryption schemes (in the 
sense of [GM]), [ G MW] showed that "every language in NP has a zero-
knowledge interactive proof system in which the prover is a probabilistic polyno-
mial-time machine that gets an NP proof as an auxiliary input." Under a stronger 
assumption, the same result was obtained independently but subsequently in 
[BC 1]. A similar result was also obtained independently by [Ch4 ], but in a very 
different model, which emphasizes the unconditional privacy of the prover's secret 
information, even if the verifier has unlimited computing resources. This model was 
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set forward in [ Ch2] and the result of [ Ch4] is a special case of a protocol pre-
viously presented in [Chi], whose properties are described in [Ch2, p. 1039]. (The 
results of [Ch4] (then [Ch3]) and [GMW] were first presented explicitly in 
March 1986 at the Marseille conference on algorithms, randomness and com-
plexity.) Finally, [BC2] considered a model in which all parties involved are 
assumed to have "reasonable" computing power (this model is also compatible with 
the setting of [Ch4] ). The current paper unifies all of these approaches. 
The difference between these models can be illustrated by an example. Consider 
again the statement by which Peggy claims to know the prime factorization of some 
public integer n. In the [GMR] model, there would be no point for her to spend 
time convincing Vic of this, because Vic knows that it is an immediate consequence 
of her unlimited computing power. In the setting of [Ch4 ], her secret factorization 
cannot possibly be unconditionally secure once the integer n is made public; she 
may therefore just as well convince Vic that she knows the factors by giving them 
explicitly to him. (But if Peggy's statement had merely been that she knows non-
trivial di visors of n, and if n is the product of several primes, the setting of [ Ch4] 
would allow Peggy to convince Vic of her knowledge without disclosing any infor-
mation as to which divisors she knows, even if Vic has unlimited computing 
power.) In the context of [BC2], on the other hand, it makes perfect sense for 
Peggy to wish to convince Vic of her knowledge via a protocol that discloses 
nothing that could help Vic compute the factors of n. In other words, the protocol 
is designed to make Vic's factoring task just as difficult after the protocol as it was 
before. 
As we shall see in Section 7, it is also interesting to distinguish between the par-
ties' available computing resources during and after the protocol. Our main result 
is a protocol that is unconditionally secure for both parties as long as Peggy is 
incapable of factoring a large integer (or extracting a discrete logarithm, or 
both simultaneously) while the protocol is taking place. Once the protocol is over, 
it is too late for either party to attempt any kind of cheating, regardless of their 
computing power. This is in sharp contrast with the result of [GMW, BCl] 
concerning NP-complete problems, which allows Vic to take as much time as he 
likes in attempts to extract Peggy's secret by deciphering the protocol's transcript 
off-line. 
2. THE BASIC PROTOCOL 
Assume Peggy knows a satisfying assignment of truth values for some Boolean 
formula. The basic protocol allows Peggy to convince Vic that she knows such an 
assignment without revealing any information about it. This protocol follows the 
lines of [Ch4]. (Other constructions are given in [GMW, BC2], but [GMW] 
requires a reduction to a graph colouring problem and [BC2] requires that blobs 
satisfy additional properties.) As an example, consider the Boolean formula 
'P = [ ( p and q) xor ( q or r)] and [ ( r xor q) or ( p and r)] 
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and let ( p =true, q = j{zfse, r =true) be Peggy's secret satisfying assignment. (This 
is of course a toy example, since it would be too easy for Vic or anyone else to find 
out how to satisfy such a simple Boolean formula.) 
As a first step, Peggy and Vic agree on the layout of a Boolean circuit to com-
pute !JI. for simplicity, we use only basic binary gates and negations in the circuit. 
(Of course, negations are not needed, since any Boolean formula can be rewritten 
efficienctly using only "NAND" gates.) The circuit for 'JI is illustrated in Fig. 1. In 
addition, this figure shows Peggy's satisfying assignment and the truth table of each 
gate (except the negation gates). Observe that one row is outlined in each truth 
table, corresponding to the circuit's computation on Peggy's satisfying assignment. 
Seeing the rows outlined is enough to easily verify that 'JI is satisfiable. This is 
achieved by simple independent checks on the consistency of each wire. for 
instance, the output of the top left "AND" gate is 0, which is indeed the first input 
of the middle row "EXCLUSIVE-OR" gate. Also, the first inputs to the top left and 
top right "AND" gates are the same, as they should be since they correspond to the 
same input variable. Lastly, the output of the final gate is 1. Notice that seeing these 
outlined rows also gives away the corresponding satisfying assignment (even if it 
were not written explicitly). The basic protocol allows Peggy to convince Vic that 
she knows how to so outline one row in each truth table-without revealing any 
information about which rows they are. 
FIG. I. A Boolean circuit with explicit truth tables and rows outlined. 
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This is achieved by an interactive protocol consisting of several rounds. In each 
round, Peggy "scrambles" the circuit's truth tables and commits to a corresponding 
collection of blobs. At this point, Vic issues one of two possible challenges to 
Peggy: one challenge requires Peggy to show that the blobs really encode a valid 
scrambling of the circuit's truth tables; the other challenge requires Peggy to open 
the rows that would be outlined, assuming it is a valid scrambling. The challenges 
are thus designed in such a way that Peggy could meet both of them only if she 
knew how to satisfy the circuit, but answering either one of them yields no informa-
tion about how. Because Peggy cannot predict ahead of time which challenges will 
be issued by Vic, each round increases Vic's confidence in Peggy. In fact, Peggy 
would be caught cheating with probability at least 50 % in each round if she were 
not able to answer both possible challenges, so that she could only hope to fool Vic 
in k successive rounds with exponentially vanishing probability 2 k. 
We call such techniques "cut-and-choose" because each round is similar to the 
classic "protocol" by which two children split a piece of cake-one of them cuts and 
the other one chooses. The great utility of a cut-and-choose like ours is that it gives 
an exponential increase in security at the cost of only a linear increase in the 
number of rounds. The earliest use of such cut-and-choose that we know of in the 
context of cryptographic protocols was presented by Rabin in 1977 [R2]. 
The "scrambling" of each truth table by Peggy consists of a random row 
permutation and column complementation. Let us illustrate this principle with an 
example. Figure 2a shows the truth table for the Boolean conjunction ("AND"). 
The rows of this table are randomly permuted to yield the table given in Fig. 2b. 
(Each of the 24 possible permutations--inciuding the identity permutation -may 
be chosen with uniform probability.) Then, one bit is randomly chosen for each of 
the three columns of the truth table. Finally, each column is complemented if and 
only if its corresponding random bit is a 1, as shown in the three intervening tables. 
The final result is illustrated in Fig. 2c. Notice that the whole scrambled truth table 
can still unmistakably be recognized as representing the Boolean conjunction 
(provided the complementation bits, shown within circles throughout the drawings, 
are specified). 
The complementations must be chosen consistently; all truth table columns 
a b c 
F1G. 2. Permutation and complementation of a truth table. 
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corresponding to the same wire in the circuit must either all be complemented or 
all remain the same. This is achieved by choosing randomly and independently 
the complementation bits corresponding to each wire. (For simplicity, we never 
complement the output of the final gate.) Figure 3 gives the result of random 
permutations and complementations of the truth tables in our original circuit from 
Fig. l. 
After producing a circuit similar to that of Fig. 3, Peggy commits to it: for each 
truth-table bit, Peggy commits to a blob that she knows how to open accordingly. 
(It is not necessary for her to actually commit to the complementation bits, but 
they must remain secret for the moment.) Coming back to our previous example 
blobs, one may think of Peggy having drawn Fig. 3 on the floor but having covered 
its bits with opaque tape before allowing Vic to look. Now that the "cut" is com-
pleted by Peggy, it is time for Vic to "choose": Vic asks Peggy to convince him of 
her good faith by requesting that she answers, at his random choice, either 
challenge "A" or challenge "B", defined as follows: 
• If the challenge is "A," Peggy must open each and every blob she just com-
mitted to. Moreover, she must also reveal all the complementation bits that she 
used in the scrambling process. Continuing our intuitive image, Peggy strips off all 
the tape in order to show Vic the equivalent of Fig. 3. This allows Vic to verify that 
FIG. 3. A circuit with randomly permutted and complemented truth tables. 
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FIG. 4. The existence of a satisfying assignment is shown. 
the information concealed by the blobs corresponds to valid permutations and 
complementations of the Boolean circuit's truth tables. 
• If the challenge is "B," Peggy opens only the blobs corresponding to one row 
in each truth table. The rows to be opened are precisely those that were outlined 
in Fig. I in their (probably) new location determined by the row permutations. Still 
continuing our image, Peggy selectively strips away pieces of tape in order to show 
Vic the equivalent of Fig. 4. This allows Vic to verify the consistency of each wire 
and the fact that the final output of the circuit is a I bit. 
3. PROOF OF THE BASIC PROTOCOL 
Three requirements must be satisfied in order to prove correctness of the basic 
protocol; the following must hold, except perhaps with an exponentially small 
probability: 
( 1) Peggy can carry out her share of the protocol, provided she knows a 
satisfying assignment for '!'. (Of course, no protocol could possibly force Vic to be 
convinced, even giving him the satisfying assignment in the clear, because he can 
always refuse to listen.) 
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(2) If Peggy does not know a satisfying assignment for 'P, no matter how she 
pretends to follow the protocol, Vic will catch her cheating. 
(3) If Peggy knows a satisfying assignment for 'P and if she faithfully follows 
her share of the protocol, she does not reveal anything to Vic that could help him 
determine her satisfying assignment (or even find partial information about 
it )-this remains true even if Vic deviates arbitrarily from his stipulated behaviour 
in the protocol. 
Defining properties (i) and (ii) of blobs allow Peggy to commit to blobs and 
open them as needed. Also, anyone can randomly permute the rows and comple-
ment the columns of a truth table, and thus obtain the equivalent of Fig. 3. Know-
ing a satisfying assignment for 'P allows Peggy to outline one row in each of the 
scrambled truth tables. She can do this simply by remembering which columns are 
complemented and where the random truth-table permutations have taken each 
row that she knows would be outlined in the originally agreed circuit. Thus, the 
first requirement is satisfied. 
The second requirement is satisfied because of the bit commitment property (ii) 
of the blobs. Assume Peggy does not know how to satisfy 'P. In any given round, 
she can either commit to genuine permutations and complementations of the 
original circuit's truth tables (similar to Fig. 3 ), or she can commit to something 
phoney. In the first case, she cannot meet challenge "B" without knowing a 
satisfying assignment for 'P; in the second case, she cannot meet challenge "A" 
without breaking the bit commitment property of blobs. Therefore, as long as she 
cannot predict the challenges to be issued by Vic, she has at least a 50 % chance 
of being caught in each round. As mentioned earlier, her probability of fooling Vic 
in k successive rounds is therefore at best 2-k. 
The reason why the third requirement is satisfied is more subtle. Let us first argue 
that Vic cannot learn anything about the satisfying assignment (beyond the fact 
that Peggy knows it) from seeing either Fig. 3 or Fig. 4 alone. If he issues challenge 
"A" and thus gets to see Fig. 3, he obtains randomly permuted and complemented 
versions of the agreed circuit's truth tables. This is of no possible use to Vic, 
because he could have produced such a figure just as well by himself (even if the 
Boolean formula were not satisfiable). On the other hand, if he issues challenge "B" 
in order to see Fig. 4, what he gets amounts to the result of applying a true one-
time pad (Peggy's independent random complementations) on the Boolean values 
carried by the circuit's wires while it computes a satisfying assignment (except for 
the final output wire, which should carry the value 1 ). Since such a one-time pad 
hides all the information, this gives no advantage either in finding the assignment. 
In other words, it is only by matching a Fig. 4 with its corresponding Fig. 3 that 
would allow Vic to learn something about the satisfying assignment; but of course 
Peggy will never answer both challenges in the same round. 
Thanks to the defining property (iii) of blobs, Vic is prevented from matching 
any Fig. 4 he can get by issuing challenge "B" with its corresponding Fig. 3. 
(Property (iii) is not relevant when Vic issues challenge "A", since in this case 
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Peggy opens all the blobs involved in the corresponding round.) Finally, property 
(iv) prevents Vic from learning anything about Peggy's secret satisfying assignment 
from the processes by which Peggy commits to and opens blobs. 
Even though the third requirement is satisfied, this does not, in general, imply 
that Vic cannot obtain anything beyond the fact that Peggy genuinely knows a 
satisfying assignment for lfl. For instance, it is possible that only Peggy has the 
technology or knowledge necessary to commit to these blobs, in which case Vic 
might obtain something he could not have produced himself-although not the 
satisfying assignment. A more interesting situation occurs if one considers a varia-
tion on the basic protocol in which all the rounds are carried out in parallel: Peggy 
commits all at once to blobs corresponding to k circuits similar to Fig. 3, Vic sends 
his string of challenges, and Peggy opens the blobs as requested by the challenges. 
(This would be more efficient in some settings.) The modified protocol makes it 
possible for Vic to choose his challenges as a function of the entire collection of 
blob commitments. Although this cannot provide him with any advantage in dis-
covering Peggy's satisfying assignment, it might allow him to subsequently convince 
others that lfl is satisfiable by showing them the transcript of his conversation with 
Peggy (see Section 6.1.2 for an example of this situation). In other words, the 
parallel version of the basic protocol remains minimum disclosure, but it may not 
be "zero-knowledge" in the terminology of [GMR]. 
Intuitively, a protocol is zero-knowledge if the third requirement is strengthened 
to the effect that Vic cannot obtain anything at all beyond learning that Peggy 
knows a satisfying assignment. More precisely, Vic must be able to simulate his 
entire conversation with Peggy without in reality ever talking to her. (Refer to 
[GMR] for a formal definition.) Nevertheless, our basic protocol is zero-
knowledge provided that blob defining property (iv) is strengthened to make sure 
that Vic does not gain anything from the process by which Peggy commits to blobs 
and that he obtains only the intended bits from the process by which Peggy opens 
some of them. Following the proof techniques of [GMR], we say that the blobs are 
sirnulatable if, in addition to properties (i ), (ii), and (iii), they satisfy 
(iv') Vic can simulate what he would have been provided in the process by 
which Peggy commits to blobs that she could open as 0 and to blobs that she could 
open as !. He can also simulate the process by which she would open these blobs 
had she committed to them herself. 
Note that this new property implies the original (iv), since Vic must be able to 
simulate the commitment and opening of blobs even if he does not know Peggy's 
secret. If simulatable blobs are used, it is easy for Vic to attempt simulating one 
round of the protocol without talking to Peggy, except that he will fail with prob-
ability 50 %. In order to do this, Vic proceeds as follows: 
• he flips a fair coin to decide whether he will be prepared to answer challenge 
"A" or challenge "B"; 
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• he randomly generates a Fig. 3 or a Fig. 4, depending on the outcome of the 
coin flip; 
• he uses property (iv') to simulate Peggy committing to a sequence of blobs 
that he knows how she would proceed to open in order to show whichever figure 
(3 or 4) he has just prepared. 
• he then (honestly!) asks himself which challenge he would issue at this point 
if he had just received all these blob commitments from the real Peggy; and 
• if he issued himself the challenge he can meet, he simulates Peggy opening 
the relevant blobs-otherwise he fails. 
The crucial point is that the defining property (iii) of blobs ensures that there is no 
correlation between the challenge Vic decides he would be ready to meet and the 
challenge he actually issues to himself. In order to simulate the whole k-round 
protocol, Vic must repeat the above an average of 2k times, pretending that the 
unlucky rounds never happened. 
This reasoning does not extend, in general, to the parallel version of the protocol. 
Assume for simplicity that blobs are bit strings and that Peggy commits to a blob 
by showing it in the clear. Consider the following stategy for Vic: after receiving 
blobs corresponding to all k circuits with randomly permuted and complemented 
truth tables from Peggy, he concatenates these blobs and uses the result as input 
to some one-way function. He then uses the first k bits of the output of this function 
to determine the k challenges to be issued. If Vic tries to adapt the above technique 
directly in order to simulate this protocol, the one-way function creates a 
dependency between the challenges that he is ready to meet and those that he 
actually issues to himself, resulting in an exponentially small probability of success. 
Even though running the protocol with Peggy does not help Vic in learning any-
thing about Peggy's secret, its transcript may enable him to convince someone else 
of the existence of this secret, because Vic could almost certainly not have produced 
the transcript otherwise. This leads to a curious penomenon: the transcript of a 
parallel version of the protocol may contain no information on Peggy's secret (in 
the sense of Shannon's information theory [S] ), yet it can be used to convince 
someone else of the secret's existence! In other words, the parallel version of the 
protocol is minimum disclosure, but it may not be zero-knowledge even if 
simulatable blobs are used. 
If it is important that the protocol be carried out in parallel (perhaps for reasons 
of efficiency), the protocol remains zero-knowledge provided that defining property 
(iv) is strengthened further. We say that the blobs are chameleon if, in addition to 
properties (i), (ii), and (iii), they satisfy: 
(iv") Vic can simulate what he would have seen in the process by which 
Peggy commits to blobs. Moreover, for each of these blobs, Vic can simulate both 
the process by which Peggy would open it as a 0 and the process by which she 
would open it as a 1. 
In other words, chameleon blobs allow Vic to do just what property (ii) prevents 
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Peggy from doing. Even if Peggy and Vic have similar computing abilities, as we 
shall see in Section 6.1, this property can sometimes be achieved if Vic has addi-
tional information. The advantage of chameleon blobs is that they allow Vic to 
simulate in a straightforward way his entire conversation with Peggy, without ever 
encountering failures. Again, this remains true even if Vic deviates arbitrarily from 
his stipulated behaviour. In our context, however, there is only one way in which 
Vic can deviate without Peggy stopping the protocol altogether: by choosing which 
challenges to issue in a way that depends on Peggy's blob commitments rather than 
choosing them randomly. However, no such strategy is of any use to Vic with 
chameleon blobs. 
In order to simulate the parallel version of the protocol, Vic simulates Peggy's 
commitment to as many blobs as she would use. Because the blobs are chameleon, 
Vic does not need to have already decided in which way he expects Peggy to be 
able to open them. At this point, Vic looks at these commitments and chooses his 
challenges exactly as if the commitments actually came from Peggy. Whenever he 
chooses challenge "A," he randomly permutes and complements the Boolean 
circuit's truth tables to produce something like Fig. 3, and he "opens" all the corre-
sponding blobs accordingly. Whenever he chooses challenge "B," he randomly 
selects one row in each truth table and one Boolean value for each wire in the cir-
cuit (except that he always selects 1 for the value of the final output wire); he then 
"opens" the blobs in these rows to reflect the value chosen for the corresponding 
wires, thus producing something like Fig. 4. 
4. A COMPLEXITY-THEORETIC POINT OF VIEW 
Because satisfiability of Boolean formulas is NP-complete [Co, GJ ], the basic 
protocol can be used to supply minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge for any 
positive statement concerning a language L in NP. Assume without loss of 
generality that Lt;;;.E*, where I: stands for {O, l} (i.e., elements of L consist of 
binary strings). By the definition of NP, there exists a "proof system" Qt;;;. L x I:* 
such that 
• (Vx EL )(3 c EI:*)[ lcl ~ p(lxl) and (x, c) E Q] for some fixed polynomial p, 
where lxl denotes the length of x; and 
• there exists a polynomial-time (deterministic) algorithm capable of deciding, 
given x and c, whether (x, c) E Q. 
In other words, whenever x EL, there exists a succinct "certificate" c to this effect, 
and one can efficiently verify that c is a valid proof that x EL. Using our terminol-
ogy, such a c is what we called "verifiable information" to the effect that x EL. 
Using Cook's theorem [Co], both Peggy and Vic can efficiently build from any 
x EI:* a Boolean formula lJ' L(x) satisfiable if and only if x EL. Moreover, because 
the proof of Cook's theorem is constructive, it is enough for Peggy to know some 
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succinct c such that <x. c) E Q in order to efficiently deduce a satisfying assignment 
for 'Pi.(.\"). 
Therefore, if LE NP, x EL, and if Peggy knows a succinct certificate c to the 
effect that x EL, then Peggy can use the basic protocol to convince Vic that 'P L(x) 
is satisfiable, hence that x E L and that she knows how to prove it. This is a mini-
mum disclosure protocol, assuming of course that Vic already knows the proof 
system for L and our basic protocol (otherwise, much information is given to Vic 
when Peggy instructs him about these). For most practical applications, it is better 
to think of an ad hoe verifying circuit, rather than building it through the machinery 
of Cook's theorem. 
As pointed out by [FFS], one may prefer not to call this type of protocol "zero-
knowledge" because Vic does gain knowledge from running it-in particular, he 
learns that x EL. Following [GHY], this is why we use the word "minimum" 
rather than "zero": Vic learns that x EL, as intended, but not the proof of this fact. 
We use "disclosure" rather that "knowledge" because Vic may gain additional 
knowledge, in general, if the blobs are not simulatable or if the protocol is carried 
out in parallel. 
It is interesting to consider both restrictions and extensions of NP in the context 
of minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge. 
The interesting restriction concerns languages LE NP n co-NP. In this case, one 
can construct for each xeE* two Boolean formulae AL(x) and Bdx) such that 
exactly one of them is satisfiable (A dx) if x EL and B dx) if x ~ L ). Clearly, their 
disjunction C L(x) = [AL(x) or BL(x)] is always satisfiable. Assume now that Peggy 
knows whether x EL or not, and that she has the corresponding succinct NP cer-
tificate. This gives her a satisfying assignment for either A L(x) or B L(x ), whichever 
is satisfiable; hence she can also satisfy C L(x ). Consider what happens if she uses 
our basic protocol to convince Vic that she knows a satisfying assignment for 
C i(x). Clearly, this does not disclose anything about x to Vic (because C L(x) is 
always satisfiable). However, it convinces Vic that Peggy knows whether x EL or 
not, and that she can prove it. This issue and its applications to identification 
systems are discussed in [FFS], but such systems must be used with caution 
because they are not always as secure as they may seem [BBDGQ]. 
Minimum disclosure protocols can also extend beyond NP if we allow the certify-
ing procedure to be probabilistic. Recall that BPP stands for the class of decision 
problems that can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time with bounded error 
probability [G]. It is reasonable to consider BPP as the real class of tractable 
problems (rather than P) because the error probability can always be decreased 
below any threshold c'i > 0 by repeating the algorithm r.t log (> 1 times and taking 
the majority answer, where the constant r.t depends only on the original error prob-
ability [BB]. It is generally believed that there is no inclusion relation either way 
between NP and BPP: non-determinism and randomness seem to be uncomparable 
powers. These powers can be combined in several ways. We consider Babai's class 
MA [Ba] to be the most natural, but we prefer calling it NBPP. This class is such 
that NP u BPP £ NBPP, hence NP is almost certainly a strict subset of NBPP. 
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The class NBPP is defined exactly as NP, except that we are satisfied with a BPP 
algorithm for deciding, given x and c, whether <x, c) e Q (i.e., we only require that 
Q e BPP ). Whenever <x, c) E Q, we now refer to c as a convincing argument for the 
fact that x EL (we no longer call it a certificate because it cannot be verified with 
certainty, in general). 
Section 5 shows how to obtain nearly minimum disclosure protocols for any 
language Lin NBPP. As is usual in this paper, we assume that both Peggy and Vic 
have "reasonable" computing power and similar algorithmic knowledge, but that 
Peggy is initially given a succinct convincing argument c to the effect that x e L. 
This allows Peggy to initially convince herself beyond any reasonable doubt that 
xe L, by running the BPP algorithm on input <x, c).The purpose of our protocol 
is for Peggy to convince Vic that she knows such a c, without disclosing anything 
that could help him find it. 
The class NBPP is Babai's class MA, which he defined for his "Arthur-Merlin 
games" [Ba] (and is similar to Papadimitriou's "stochastic satisfiability" in his 
"games against nature" [Pa]). According to Babai, his other class AM is a better 
candidate for the generalization of NP to probabilistic computations. In particular, 
he proved that MA s:;; AM. The interest in AM is further increased by the proof 
that, for any fixed k ~ 2, AM= IP(k ), the class of languages that allow an inter-
active protocol with no more than k rounds [GS]. All these considerations are 
theoretically very compelling. 
We claim nonetheless that MA (i.e., NBPP) is a more natural class for practical 
purposes, at least in cryptographic settings. If Le NBPP and x EL, it is enough for 
Peggy to know one succinct convincing argument c to this effect. In practice, this 
c need not be God-given to Peggy. As mentioned earlier, it is easy for some 
languages to generate both x and the corresponding c by a probabilistic process. 
Consider, for instance, the set B of integers having exactly two prime factors. If 
Peggy generates two distinct random integers p and q that pass a probabilistic 
primality test [SS, Rl] to her satisfaction, she is convinced that n = pq is a member 
of Band her convincing argument is < p, q ). The protocol given in Section 5 allows 
her to convince Vic that n E B without disclosing anything else that might help him 
factor n. (In this case, BE NP because the set of primes is in NP [Pr]. This does 
not reduce the practical interest of our example, however, because Peggy may find 
it prohibitive to convert her NBPP convincing argument < p, q) into an NP cer-
tificate < p, c( p ), q, c( q)), where c( • ) stands for an NP certificate that • is prime. 
This remark remains true in practice despite the results of [GK, AH].) 
By contrast, it is not clear that Peggy can reasonably be asked to carry out an 
AM protocol-regardless of the minimum disclosure considerations-even if she 
were initially given a succinct piece of advice: an AM protocol would, in general, 
require Peggy to determine an NP-like certificate as a function of a random string 
supplied by Vic. This is a pity in a way, because it is trivial that our basic protocol 
allows the transformation of any AM protocol into a minimum disclosure one. As 
explained in [GMW], this is true because once "Arthur" has given "Merlin" his 
coin flips, it "only" remains for Merlin to satisfy an NP statement, which can be 
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done without disclosing anything else if the basic protocol of Section 2 is used with 
simulatable blobs. 
5. GOING BEYOND NP: THE PROBABILISTIC CASE 
Consider any language Le NBPP. Let x be such that Peggy knows a succinct 
convincing argument c to the effect that x EL. Because c is not an NP certificate, 
Peggy is not absolutely certain that x EL, but she can reduce her probability of 
error below any desired threshold by the virtues of BPP. The purpose of the 
minimum disclosure protocol described in this section is for Peggy to convince Vic 
that x e L and that she knows a convincing argument to this effect, but in a way 
that does not help Vic determine this convincing argument or any information 
about it. If the underlying blobs are simulatable, we call this process a "non-trans-
itive transfer of confidence" because it convinces Vic that x EL (a statement about 
which Peggy is convinced already) in a way that he cannot subsequently convince 
anyone else. 
Note that Vic could be fooled by this process in several different ways. It may be 
that Peggy is dishonest and that she does not really know a convincing argument 
to the effect that x e L, but that she succeeds (with exponentially small probability) 
in fooling Vic by being lucky enough each time to be asked the only challenge she 
is capable of answering (exactly as she could have done with the basic deterministic 
protocol). It is also possible that Peggy is honest but wrong in her belief (because 
the certifying BPP algorithm misled her). In this case, it is most likely that Peggy 
will discover her mistake as a result of trying to convince Vic, but it is also possible 
that the certifying algorithm will err once more. Finally, it is possible that Peggy 
is honest and correct in her claim, but that when she runs the protocol with Vic, 
the verdict comes out wrong owing to an error of the certifying algorithm. 
As a preliminary step, Peggy and Vic agree on the error probability {) they are 
willing to tolerate for the certifying algorithm. From this agreement, they modify 
the algorithm so that its probability of error does not exceed l> (for this, they first 
determine how many times the original algorithm must be repeated for the majority 
answer to be almost certainly correct [BB] ). From now on, we assume without loss 
of generality that the probability of error of the certifying algorithm is negligible. 
In essence, Peggy wants to convince Vic that she knows some secret input c such 
that the certifying algorithm will (almost certainly) accept the input (x, c ). Let n 
and m denote the size of x and c, respectively. Assume for simplicity, and without 
Joss of generality, that the value of m is uniquely determined as a known (easy to 
compute) function of n, so that the protocol need not hide the value of m from Vic. 
Let r be an upper bound on the number of coin flips that the certifying algorithm 
can perform on any input (x, c), where c is of size m. An argument similar to the 
proof of Cook's theorem shows that this gives rise to a Boolean formula 'l' with at 
least m + r variables. If the first m variables of this formula are set to represent the 
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binary string c, and the next r variables are determined by independent random 
coin flips, then (except with probability at most ~) it is easy to set the other 
variables (if any) so as to satisfy the whole formula if and only if c is a valid con-
vincing argument that x EL. This formula can be constructed from knowledge of x 
and of the certifying procedure, with no need for the secret convincing argument c. 
Hence, it can be made public. As before, it is converted into a Boolean circuit on 
which both Peggy and Vic agree. 
The basic minimum disclosure protocol of Section 2 cannot be used directly, 
because Vic cannot trust Peggy to choose the r appropriate inputs truly at random. 
On the other hand, Peggy cannot allow Vic to choose these variables either, 
because a careful choice might allow Vic to obtain information on Peggy's secret 
convincing argument c. It is therefore necessary to use a coin-flipping subprotocol 
to set these inputs to random values not under the control of either party. 
Moreover, Vic should not be allowed to see the outcome of the coin flips, again 
to prevent him from learning information about c (i.e., coin flipping should be per-
formed "in a well" [BI]). In order to allow Peggy to use these coin flips without 
ever showing their outcome to Vic, it is necessary that the coin-flipping protocol 
produce blob commitments rather than simply bits. Finally, Peggy must not be 
allowed to choose her c as a function of the coin flips. 
It is much easier to implement all these requirements if we ask that blobs have 
two additional properties: 
(v) Given two unopened blobs that she has committed to, Peggy can 
convince Vic that she could open them to show the same bit (provided this is so) 
without disclosing any additional information. 
(vi) Given two unopened blobs that she has committed to, Peggy can 
convince Vic that she could open them to show distinct bits (provided this is so) 
without disclosing anything else. 
As we shall see in Section 6.5, however, property (vi) is always a consequence of 
properties (i) through (v), and property (v) is itself a consequence of properties (i) 
through (iv). 
Coin flipping capable of producing a blob is trivial to implement with property 
(vi): Peggy commits to two blobs that she can open to show distinct bits, she con-
vinces Vic that this is so, and she asks him to choose one of them. When Vic makes 
his choice, the coin flip is determined and Peggy knows its outcome-which is the 
bit she could show by opening the blob chosen by Vic. However, Vic cannot tell 
how it went unless Peggy subsequently opens this blob (which she will never do in 
the protocol below). Property (iii) prevents Vic from influencing the coin flip, and 
properties (ii) and (vi) prevent Peggy from doing so. 
We are now ready to describe our general protocol for the case of probabilisti-
cally verifiable information. Recall that Peggy and Vic have agreed on a Boolean 
circuit corresponding to the certifying algorithm intended to probabilistically verify 
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Peggy's secret convincing argument c that x e L. At this point, Peggy commits once 
and for all to her convincing argument by committing to m blobs that she could 
open to show the bits of c. Then, Peggy and Vic flip r coins "in a well" by the above 
procedure, which results in r blob commitments corresponding to the outcome of 
the coin flips. Peggy can now use a slight variation on the basic protocol of 
Section 2 in order to convince Vic that she knows how to select the other inputs 
of the circuit (if any) so as to satisfy it. 
The basic protocol must be modified in order to force Peggy to use the proper 
bits for the inputs corresponding to c and to the coin flips, but this must be 
achieved without disclosing anything that could help Vic learn about the value of 
these bits. We illustrate how this can be done with the example of Section 2. 
Assume that Peggy has committed to some blob b (which she could open as 1, but 
Vic does not know this). Peggy wishes to convince Vic that she knows a satisfying 
assignment for '!' in which the first input corresponds to the bit she could open as 
blob b. For this purpose, Peggy randomly permutes and complements the Boolean 
circuit's truth tables to produce a Fig. 3, and she commits to it exactly as before. 
Moreover, for each input bit that Peggy has committed to (the first input bit in our 
example, the first m + r bits in general), she now commits to the complementation 
bit used on the corresponding wire to produce the current Fig. 3. 
If Vic issues challenge "A," Peggy opens each and every blob she has just com-
mitted to and reveals all the complementation bits used, thus showing Fig. 3 to Vic, 
still exactly as 'in the deterministic basic protocol. If Vic issues challenge "B," 
however, she must do more than showing Fig. 4 to Vic (which would say nothing 
about the first Boolean variable of the satisfying assignment). Because the wire 
corresponding to the first input is set to 0 in Fig. 4 (as shown by the first bit in the 
outlined row of the top left truth table), Peggy uses property ( v) to convince Vic 
that she could open the blob associated with the corresponding wire complementa-
tion in the same way as she could open blob b. If the wire corresponding to this 
input had been a I, she would, of course, have used property (vi) instead. 
This completes the description of our protocol for the case of probabilistically 
verifiable information. In general, however, it is not a minimum disclosure protocol 
from a theoretical point of view. The subtle difficulty is that different convincing 
arguments may cause the certifying procedure to fail with different probabilities. 
Because he is generally unable to predict the failure probability, Vic cannot 
simulate exactly the conversation that would take place if he were really talking to 
Peggy. Moreover, running the protocol an exponentially large number of times with 
Peggy could in principle allow a very powerful Vic to increase his chances to guess 
correctly Peggy's secret (by keeping a tally of how many times the protocol showed 
a failure of the certifying algorithm). For all practical purposes, however, this threat 
is of no consequence if fJ is chosen small enough; the protocol can thus be used 
safely. 
A variation on this scheme is almost always minimum disclosure, but it is usually 
more time consuming. To achieve this, the original BPP certifying algorithm has to 
be modified, by repeating it enough times and taking the majority, so that all 
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but exponentially few of the random choices may cause it to give the wrong answer 
on even a single input. The fact that this is possible can be proven by a refinement 
of the proof that MA s;; AM [Ba]. This allows use of the basic protocol from 
Section 2 almost directly, with no need for the coin tossing to be in a well or for 
blob properties ( v) and ( vi ). 
6. BLOB IMPLEMENTATIONS 
We have taken the existence of blobs for granted in the previous sections. Let us 
now see how they can be implemented in practice. This can be done in several ways. 
None of these implementations is ideal, however. The choice of implementation 
should be based on the particular requirements of the application. The safety of 
most of the following implementations depends on unproved assumptions about the 
computational difficulty of solving particular problems. Section 7 compares the 
advantages and drawbacks of these various approaches. 
As an elementary (but probably not very secure) example, consider two 
isomorphic graphs G and H upon which Peggy and Vic agree. Assume that Peggy 
is convinced that they are isomorphic, but that she does not actually know an 
isomorphism between them. Suppose further that she is computationally incapable 
of finding such an isomorphism in a reasonable amount of time. (Let us postpone 
until Section 6.1.3 the question of how Peggy could be convinced that the graphs 
are isomorphic, without herself explicitly knowing an isomorphism.) In this setting, 
Peggy agrees with Vic that any graph for which she can show an isomorphism with 
G (resp. H) is a commitment to the bit 0 (resp. 1 ). Referring to the defining proper-
ties of blobs, property ( i) holds because Peggy can commit to the bit 0 ( resp. l ) by 
randomly permuting the vertices of G (resp. H) and showing the resulting 
graph-the blob--to Vic. In order to open a blob, it suffices for Peggy to show Vic 
the isomorphism she knows with G or H, whichever is the case. Property (ii) holds 
if and only if Peggy cannot find an isomorphism between G and H while the 
protocol is in progress. (More precisely, in order for Peggy to break property (ii), 
she must have obtained information that makes it easy for her to discover such an 
isomorphism.) Property (iii) holds unconditionally because blobs used by Peggy as 
commitments to O are information-theoretically indistinguishable from those used 
as commitments to 1. These blobs are simulatable because property (iv') is satisfied: 
Vic does not need Peggy's help to permute randomly the vertices of G and H. 
Finally, these blobs are chameleon-property (iv")--if and only if Vic knows an 
isomorphism between G and H. 
As illustrated by this example, it is not the blob itself (some graph isomorphic to 
both G and H) that determines a bit, but rather Peggy's knowledge about it (the 
actual isomorphism known by Peggy between this graph and either G or H). Thus, 
many bit commitment schemes (but not those of Sections 6.3 and 6.4) consist of two 
sets, X and Y, together with an efficiently computable verification function 
v: X x Y -.. { 0, 1, • } , where "•" stands for "undefined" (that is, this y E Y is irrele-
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vant for this x EX). In order to commit to bit b E { 0, 1 } , Peggy chooses a pair x e X 
and v E y such that v(x, y) =b. Here, x is the blob and Y is Peggy's additional 
kno~ledge about it. The actual commitment occurs when Peggy shows x to Vic. In 
order to open the blob, Peggy shows y to Vic and lets him compute v(x, y). For 
this to be efficient and secure, we need the following properties: 
(i) Given b E { 0, 1 }, Peggy can generate pairs x EX and y E Y such that 
v(x,y)=b. 
(ii) Peggy cannot obtain any triple xEX, y0 e Y, and Y1 E Y such that 
v(x, y0 ) = 0 and v(x, yi) = l. 
(iii) When Peggy gives Vic some XE X, Vic cannot learn anything about 
whether Peggy also knows a ye Y such that v(x, y) = 0 or such that v(x, y) = l. 
(iv) The way in which Peggy chooses her pairs <x. y) satisfying property (i) 
is uncorrelated to any secret she wishes to keep from Vic. 
These four requirements are slight restrictions on the corresponding defining blob 
properties of Section 1, which is why we continue to refer to them by the same 
symbols. If the blobs are to be simulatable, we must also require that: 
(iv') Given b E { 0, I}. Vic also can generate pairs x e X and y E Y such that 
v(x, y) =b. Moreover, Vic can generate these pairs with the same probability 
distribution as Peggy would according to property (i). 
In particular, it is sufficient for Vic to know the process by which Peggy generates 
blobs satisfying property (i) for these blobs to be simulatable. This will in fact be 
the case throughout Sections 6.1 and 6.2, but it will not be repeated there. Finally, 
the blobs are chameleon provided that: 
(iv") Vic can generate triples x EX, Yo E Y, and Yi E Y such that v(x, y 0 ) = 0 
and v(x, yi) =I. Moreover, the pairs (x, y0 ) (resp. (x, Yi)) thus generated are 
obtained with the same probability distribution as the pairs <x. y > that Peggy 
would generate according to property (i) in order to commit to the bit 0 (resp. l ). 
There is an apparent contradiction between properties (ii) and (iii). If there exist 
x, y 0 , and Yi such that v(x, y 0 ) = 0 and v(x, Yi)= 1, why should Peggy be unable 
to obtain them, and thus violate property (ii)? On the other hand, if each x EX 
unambiguously determines the only possible non-undefined value for v(x, y ), why 
should Vic not be able to determine this value upon seeing x, and thus violate 
property (iii)? 
We offer several different ways to resolve this. Section 6.1 investigates blobs that 
are unconditionally secure for Peggy (such as the graph isomorphism implementa-
tion outlined above). In this case, property (iii) holds regardless of Vic's computing 
power. This is achieved by asking that, for every x in X, there must exist at least 
one Yo and one y i in Y such that v(x, y 0 ) = 0 and v(x, y i) = 1. Moreover, the prob-
ability that Peggy generates any given blob x satisfying property ( i) must be the 
same whether she wishes to commit to 0 or to I. These additional requirements 
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clearly imply that Vic cannot learn anything about which way Peggy is able to 
open any unopened blob she has committed to. However, they also imply that 
Peggy could in principle violate property (ii); but our implementations are designed 
to make this computationally infeasible for her (under suitable assumptions). As a 
result, these blobs are ruled out by the [GMR] model because an infinitely power-
ful prover could always cheat them, but they fit within the models of [Ch4, BC2]. 
Some of these blobs are chameleon, which therefore allows the basic protocol to be 
zero-knowledge even if carried out in parallel, as explained in Section 3. 
Section 6.2 investigates blobs that are unconditionally secure for Vic. In this case, 
property (ii) holds regardless of Peggy's computing power. This is achieved by 
asking that, for every x in X, there must not exist simultaneously a y 0 and a y 1 in 
Y such that v(x, Yo)= 0 and v(x, y i) = 1. This additional requirement clearly 
implies that Peggy is irrevocably committed to a specific bit each time she utters a 
blob. However, it also implies that Vic could in principle violate property (iii); but 
our implementations are designed to make this computationally infeasible for him 
(again under suitable assumptions). These blobs lead to zero-knowledge interactive 
protocols in the sense of [GMR] and to protocols similar to those of 
[GMW, BCl]. Of course, none of these blobs are chameleon. 
Section 6.3 considers blobs that are secure even if all parties have unlimited com-
puting power. These blobs do not fit the mold of the verification function v 
described earlier. Blobs of Section 6.3.1 make use of quantum physical principles. 
Using these blobs, it is provably impossible for Vic to obtain any information on 
Peggy's secret (assuming that quantum physics is correct). Although quantum blobs 
could in principle be cheated by Peggy, this would require a technology far beyond 
any foreseeable future. Blobs of Section 6.3.2 can be used in a multiparty environ-
ment under the assumption that the honest participants outnumber the cheaters. 
Section 6.4 describes some relation between blobs and conceptually simpler 
primitives such as Rabin's oblivious transfer. This allows us to give very weak 
assumptions for the existence of blobs. These blobs also do not fit the mold of 
verification functions. Depending on the underlying oblivious transfer capability, we 
obtain blobs unconditionally secure for Peggy, for Vic, or for both of them. 
Given any two blobs Peggy has committed to, Section 6.5 shows how she can 
convince Vic that she can open them to show either the same bit or distinct bits, 
whichever is the case, without disclosing anything else. This possibility was used 
extensively in Section 5 (optional properties ( v) and ( vi) ). 
Finally, Section 6.6 outlines a potential generalization to multi-valued blobs, 
which allows the efficiency of the basic protocol of Section 2 to be improved. 
6.1. Blobs Unconditionally Secure for the Prover 
6.1.1. Based on Factoring [BC2] 
Some elementary number theory is necessary to understand this particular 
implementation of blobs. Let n be an integer. z: denotes the set of integers 
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relatively prime to n between 1 and n - 1. An integer x e z: is a quadratic residue 
modulo n if there exists a ye z: such that x = y 2 (mod n ). This is denoted as 
x e QR,,. Such a y is called a square root of x, modulo n. Let s be any fixed 
quadratic residue. A uniformly distributed random quadratic residue can be 
generated by choosing ye Z,~ at random and computing x = y 2 s mod n. This holds 
in particular ifs= 1. The crucial fact is that it is information-theoretically impossible 
to distinguish a quadratic residue thus produced using any given s e QR,, from one 
produced using s = 1. 
Now, let n = pq be the product of two distinct odd primes. The problem of 
extracting square roots modulo n is computationally equivalent to the problem of 
factoring n [R3]. We shall assume here that factoring n is almost always infeasible 
when p and q are sufficiently large. Therefore, given n and s E QR,,, we assume that 
it is infeasible to compute a square root of s modulo n unless the factorization of 
n is known. 
At the outset of the protocol, Vic randomly chooses two distinct large primes p 
and q, and he computes their product n = pq. Vic also chooses a random t E '11.: 
(t =I= ± 1) and computes s = t 2 mod n. Vic gives n and s to Peggy. Using a minimum 
disclosure protocol [Be, BC 1 ], Vic convinces Peggy that s is a quadratic residue 
modulo n and that he knows one of its square roots. (Notice that in this initializa-
tion phase of the protocol, Vic temporarily takes the role of prover and Peggy that 
of verifier.) 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X =QR,,, Y = Z,~. and 
! 0 if x = y 2 (mod n) v(x,y)= l• ifx=y 2 s(modn) 
otherwise. 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, Peggy 
randomly chooses a y E z: and computes x = y2 sb mod n. She gives x to Vic but 
keeps y as her secret witness that allows her to open blob x as bit b. Clearly, 
any quadratic residue can be used by Peggy as a commitment to 0 just as well as 
to 1, depending only on her knowledge about it. Therefore, property (iii) holds in 
a very strong sense: blobs committed to by Peggy convey no information on the 
bits she could show by opening them. Property (ii) holds computationally because 
Peggy could easily obtain a square root of s (which we assumed to be infeasible for 
her) from knowledge of y 0 and y 1 such that y6 = YT s (mod n ). 
It is obvious that these blobs leave the door wide open for Peggy to cheat if she 
succeeds in extracting a square root of s. There is also a subtler possibility for Vic 
to cheat and thus learn everything about Peggy's secret. In order to achieve this, 
Vic must be "daring" from the beginning, because he must give Peggy a quadratic 
non-residue as his s. If he succeeds in convincing Peggy that s is a quadratic 
residue-which can only happen with an exponentially small probability-then 
Peggy can open as 0 blobs she has committed to precisely if they are quadratic 
residues, a condition that Vic can easily determine with the help of his factorization 
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of n. Nevertheless, we classify these blobs as "unconditionally secure for Peggy" 
because only luck can allow Vic to cheat-no amount of computing power can help 
him. 
In addition, these blobs are chameleon because Vic's knowledge of t, a square 
root of s, allows him to create blobs for which he can simulate Peggy's opening as 
either 0 or 1. To do this, Vic generates a random y E z: and computes 
x = y 2 s mod n and P = yt mod n. He can then simulate Peggy's opening of this blob 
as a 0 ( resp. 1 ), by using .P ( resp. y ). 
6.1.2. Based on the Discrete Logarithm [COG, BKK] 
Let p be a large prime and let r:1. generate z;, the multiplicative group of integers 
modulo p. Given any integer y, it is easy to compute a"' mod p, but no efficient 
algorithm is known to invert this process, an operation known as computing the 
"discrete logarithm modulo p." The intractability assumption of the discrete 
logarithm was used in the very first paper published on public-key cryptography 
[OH]. It can also be used to create blobs, provided it is strengthened to assume 
that computing discrete logarithms modulo a large prime p remains infeasible even 
if the factorization of p - 1 is known. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on a prime number p for 
which both of them know the factorization of p - 1. They also agree on et, a 
generator of the group z;. Thanks to their knowledge of the factors of p - 1, they 
can both verify with certainty that p is a prime and that ix is a generator. These 
same parameters p and r:1. can be public, in the sense that they can be used with no 
breach of security by all parties wishing to engage in minimum disclosure protocols. 
At the outset, Vic also chooses a random s EI; (s #- I) and gives it to Peggy. 
Assuming the intractability of the discrete logarithm, Peggy cannot compute e such 
that s= et" (mod p). 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X =I;, Y = {O, 1, 2, ... , p- 2}, and 
0 
v(x, y) = 
• 
if x = ixY (mod p) 
if x = sr:1.Y (mod p) 
otherwise . 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, Peggy 
randomly chooses a y E Y and computes x = shix.v mod p. She gives x to Vic but 
keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as bit b. Clearly, any 
element of z; can be used by Peggy as commitment to 0 just as well as to 1, 
depending only on her knowledge about it. Therefore, property (iii) holds uncondi-
tionally, as with the implementation of Section 6.1.l: blobs committed to by Peggy 
still contain no information on the way in which she could open them. Property (ii} 
holds computationally because Peggy could easily obtain e (which we assumed to 
be infeasible for her) from knowledge of y0 and y 1 such that aY1 = sr:1.>'2 (mod p). 
Despite a superficial resemblance, there is a fundamental difference between this 
implementation of blobs and that of Section 6.1. l. There is no longer any possibility 
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for Vic to cheat. The fact that blobs that Peggy can open as 0 and blobs that she 
can open as 1 are information-theoretically indistinguishable depends only on the 
fact that p is a prime and that a generates 1- 1~, and both are verifiable by Peggy 
before starting the protocol. Using the terminology of [GMW], this implementa-
tion of blobs turns the basic protocol presented here into a "perfect zero-knowledge 
interactive protocol" for satisfiability (except that it does not fit their model as an 
interactive protocol, since they allow the prover to be infinitely powerful, in which 
case she would have no problem computing e-which explains why Fortnow's 
theorem [F] does not apply). Such a perfect zero-knowledge interactive protocol 
was incorrectly claimed in [BC2] of the implementation corresponding to the blobs 
of Section 6.1.1. Notice, however, that it is computationally more efficient to use the 
blobs of Section 6.1.1. 
Besides efficiency, there is another price to pay for making it impossible for Vic 
to cheat: the "discrete logarithm blobs" are not chameleon, and thus the basic 
protocol should not immediately be performed in parallel if it is to be zero-
knowledge. If it were performed in parallel, Vic could cheat by choosing a random 
integer e and computing 2a" mod p as the s he gives to Peggy. Assume that Peggy 
uses the parallel version of the protocol to convince Vic that she knows the proof 
of some theorem T. If Vic uses a one-way function, for example, to select his 
challenges, he could subsequently use the transcript, together with the value of e, 
to convince others that T is true. Indeed, there is no obvious way in which Vic 
could have created this transcript by himself, unless he knows a proof of T or the 
discrete logarithm of 2. This illustrates a very curious phenomenon: although the 
transcript of the protocol can be used as evidence that T is true, it cannot be used 
in any way to facilitate finding such a proof. Moreover, the transcript contains no 
information on the proof of T, even in the sense of Shannon's information theory 
[S]! 
With some preprocessing, it is possible to add the chameleon property to these 
blobs. Rather than choosing s randomly in 21~, Vic randomly chooses an integer e 
between 1 and p- 2 and computes s = ae mod p. Using a minimum disclosure 
protocol [CEGP], he then convinces Peggy that he knows the discrete logarithm 
of s, which is all he needs to meet property (iv"). Note that in this case Vic would 
also convince Peggy that s is in the subgroup generated by a, so that the require-
ment that a be a generator of '11. 1~ is no longer crucial for Peggy's safety. Therefore, 
if we tolerate an exponentially small probability that Vic could gain information on 
Peggy's secret, the factorization of p - 1 need not be known and thus the assump-
tion about the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms can be relaxed. 
6.1.3. Based on Graph Isomorphism [BC2] 
Define a graph G to be hard if it is computationally infeasible with high probabil-
ity, given G and a random isomorphic copy of G, to figure out the isomorphism. 
We assume that hard graphs exist and that they can be obtained in practice. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on some hard graph 
G = (N, E).Vic randomly chooses a permutation a: N-> N and uses it to produce 
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H = <N, E' ), where (u, v) EE' if and only if (a(u), a(v)) e E. He then gives H to 
Peggy and convinces her that G and H are isomorphic without disclosing anything 
about the isomorphism a [GMW]. By our assumption, it is computationally 
infeasible for Peggy to determine a (or any other isomorphism between G and H) 
in a reasonable amount of time. 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = { K = < N, E) I K is a graph isomorphic 
to G}, Y = { y: N-+ NI y is a permutation}, and l 0 if (u, v) E Eiff (y(u), }'(v))E E v(<N,E),y)= 1
0 
if(u,v)eEifT(y(u),y(v))eE' 
otherwise. 
The reader can easily verify that all the defining blob properties hold and that these 
blobs are also chameleon. 
6.2. Blobs Unconditionally Secure for the Verifier 
6.2. l. Based on Quadratic Residuosity [BCI] 
To understand these blobs, further elementary number theory is needed. We refer 
the reader to [BCI] for the relevant background. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy randomly chooses two distinct large primes 
p and q, and she computes their product n = pq. She also randomly chooses a 
quadratic non-residue s modulo n with Jacobi symbol + l. She discloses n and s to 
Vic. She then convinces Vic that n has only two prime factors [PG] and that s is 
a quadratic non-residue modulo n [GMR, GHY], without disclosing any addi-
tional information. Following the quadratic residuosity assumption [GM], we 
assume that Vic cannot distinguish random quadratic residues from non-residues 
with Jacobi symbol + I. 
The blobs are now defined by the sets X = z: [ + l ], Y = Z::', and 
0 
v(x, y)= 
if x= y 2 (mod n) 
ifx:=y2 s(modn) 
otherwise. 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, Peggy 
randomly chooses a ye Z::' and computes x = y 2 s6 mod n. She gives x to Vic but 
keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as bit b. (Although 
Peggy's knowledge of the factors of n would allow her to recompute y from x, she 
saves time and effort by remembering it.) Peggy can open x as 0 if and only if it 
is a quadratic residue. This shows that property (ii) holds unconditionally, because 
any given x is either a quadratic residue or not. Property (iii), however, holds only 
computationally, because we have assumed that testing quadratic residuosity is 
infeasible for Vic. 
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6.2.2. Based on the Discrete Logarithm 
Let p be a large prime, let a generate z; and let u be the smallest integer such 
that 2" does not divide p - l. Given any s E z;, it is easy to compute the u - 1 least 
significant bits of the unique e such that 0:::;;; e:::;;; p - 2 and s = ry_• (mod p ). Under 
the intractability assumption of the discrete logarithm, however, it is infeasible to 
learn anything about the uth least significant bit of e, because this problem is as 
hard as that of the discrete logarithm itself [ Pe]. 
At the outset of the protocol, Peggy and Vic agree on p and r7. exactly as in 
Section 6.1.2. Let u be as above. The blobs are now defined by the sets X = Z:, 
Y= {O, 1,2,. .. , p-2}, and 
v(x,y)={~" ifx = ry_Y (mod p) 
otherwise, 
where y 11 denotes the uth least-significant bit of y. 
Property (i) holds because whenever she wishes to commit to some bit b, Peggy 
randomly chooses a yez; such that y 11 =b and computes x=ry.Ymodp. She gives 
x to Vic but keeps y secret as her witness that allows her to open blob x as bit b. 
(Contrary to Section 6.2.l, Peggy must remember yin order to open x because she 
could not recompute it from x.) Property (ii) holds unconditionally, because a is a 
generator of z;; hence the discrete logarithm of x is uniquely defined. Property (iii) 
holds from a computational point of view under the strengthened discrete-
logarithm assumption (see Section 6.1.2). 
6.2.3. Based on any Probabilistic Encryption Schemes [GMW] 
A probabilistic encryption scheme in the sense of [GM] is a polynomial-time 
computable function f: Bx Y-+ X that, on input b E Band "coin tosses" y E Y, out-
puts an encryption f(h, y) of b. Decryption is unique: f(h 1 , yi) = f(b 2 , y 2 ) implies 
that b1 = b2 • However, it is assumed to be computationally infeasible to learn any-
thing about b from f(b, y) without knowledge of some "trap-door" information. 
Taking B = { 0, l } , we define blobs by 
"Ix. y)~ I'. if f(O, y) = x ifj(l, y)=x 
otherwise. 
The reader can easily verify that all the defining blob properties hold. 
6.3. Blobs That No Amount of Computing Power Can Break 
6.3.l. Quantum Blobs [BB3] 
We assume in this section that the reader is familiar with the principles of quan-
tum cryptography [BB 1, BB2]. Charles H. Bennett has suggested that blobs could 
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be implemented with similar principles. Indeed, quantum blobs can be implemented 
by a process very similar to quantum coin-tossing [BB2], which we do not repeat 
here. Let us say only that it can be proven that any cheating successfully conducted 
by Vic would lead to an apparatus capable of transmitting information faster than 
the speed of light. In principle, the Einstein--Rosen-Podolsky "paradox" [EPR, M] 
allows Peggy to cheat, exactly as with the coin-tossing protocol, but the technology 
needed to perform this cheating is far beyond any in the foreseeable future. More 
details are forthcoming [ BB3]. 
6.3.2. Multi-party Blohs [CCD] 
Blobs unconditionally secure for all parties can be obtained in a multiparty 
environment, assuming that more than two thirds of the participants are honest-in 
some cases only one half suffices---and that each pair of participants shares a 
private channel. Even a coalition of nearly a third of the participants with unlimited 
computing power cannot cheat the honest ones. For more details, consult [CCD]. 
6.4. Oblivious Transfer, AN DOS, and Blobs 
Oblivious transfer is a powerful tool invented by Rabin [R4]. It involves two 
parties: Sam (the sender) and Rachel (the receiver). In the protocol's simplest 
form, Sam transmits one bit to Rachel in such a way that she has a 50 % chance 
of receiving it. Neither party can influence whether or not the transmission will be 
successful. At the end of the transmission, Rachel knows whether she received the 
transmitted bit, but Sam does not know unless Rachel tells him. 
ANDOS stands for "all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets." It is a tool invented by 
Wiesner [W] and investigated further by Brassard, Crepeau, and Robert [BCR 1, 
BCR2] and Chaum [Ch3]. Here, Sam owns n secret bit strings si, s2 , .•• , s,.. The 
AN DOS protocol allows Rachel to choose any i, I ~ i ~ n, and obtain si from Sam 
in such a way that he cannot tell which secret she got. On the other hand, the 
protocol does not allow Rachel to learn anything about more than one of Sam's 
secrets. 
The connection between ANDOS and the seemingly simpler oblivious transfer is 
achieved by a sequence of reductions discussed in [BCR 1, Cr]: any protocol for the 
oblivious transfer can be transformed efficiently into a protocol for ANDOS. 
Moreover, if the underlying oblivious transfer protocol is unconditionally secure for 
Rachel (that is, if there is no way Sam can learn anything without Rachel's help 
about whether the transmitted bit was received), then the corresponding ANDOS 
protocol is also unconditionally secure for Rachel (that is, there is no way Sam can 
learn anything without Rachel's help about which secret she requested). 
Blobs can be obtained easily from ANDOS and thus from oblivious transfer. For 
this purpose, Peggy assumes the role of Rachel, and Vic that of Sam. When she 
wants to commit to some bit h, Peggy asks Vic to prepare two secret random bit 
strings s0 and Si, and she obtains sb through ANDOS. At this point, Vic has no 
idea whether Peggy knows s0 or s 1 ; but she cannot know both of them. In order 
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to open the blob, it suffices for Peggy to show Vic whichever string she had 
requested. She has an exponentially small chance of guessing the other string if she 
tries to cheat in opening the blob. Such attempted violation of property (ii), 
however, poses no appreciably greater risk to Vic than the exponentially small 
chance that Peggy already has (in the protocol of Section 2) of correctly guessing 
every challenge Vic will issue. 
Blobs can also be obtained directly from oblivious transfer. For this, let Peggy 
assume the role of Sam, and Vic that of Rachel. In order to commit to some bit b, 
Peggy chooses a Boolean matrix M at random, except that the parity of the 
number of I's in each row is equal to b. Peggy then sends Vic, in some agreed 
order, each bit of M separately by means of oblivious transfer. At this point, 
nothing is revealed about b unless Vic was lucky enough to obtain each and every 
bit in at least one row of M, which is exponentially unlikely in the number of 
columns. In order to open the blob, Peggy gives Vic all the bits of M in the clear. 
Peggy can attempt to cheat by lying about one bit in each row, in the hope that 
Vic obtained none of these bits during the oblivious transfer phase; but this is 
exponentially unlikely in the number of rows. 
The blobs based on ANDOS and those based directly on oblivious transfer are 
dual of each other, just as the blobs described in Section 6.1 are dual of the blobs 
described in Section 6.2. Assume, for instance, that the underlying oblivious transfer 
protocol is unconditionally secure for the receiver. The blobs based on ANDOS are 
then unconditionally secure for Peggy (as in Section 6.1 ): nothing Vic can do will 
enable him to learn anything about the bit committed to by Peggy unless she opens 
it. On the other hand, the blobs based directly on oblivious transfer are uncondi-
tionally secure for Vic (as in Section 6.2): although Peggy could successfully cheat 
in opening a blob, she can only do this by being extremely lucky-no amount of 
computing power can help her. Both implementations are unconditionally secure 
for Peggy and for Vic (except with exponentially small probability) if the underly-
ing oblivious transfer protocol is unconditionally secure for both parties. 
Even though oblivious transfer is conceptually simpler than bit commitment, it 
seems to be an inherently more powerful primitive. Indeed, we do not know of any 
construction capable of achieving oblivious transfer from blobs that satisfy only 
defining properties (i) through (iv) (although this becomes possible if we add an 
appropriate "trap-door" property to the definition of blobs). Moreover, bit commit-
ment is a universal primitive for minimum disclosure, whereas oblivious transfer 
is a universal primitive for the more general multiparty computation in which all 
parties have secrets [COG]. 
6.5. Proving Blob Equality and Inequality 
In this section, we address the question of how Peggy can convince Vic that she 
can open any two blobs she has committed to, and show the same bit or opposite 
bits, whichever is the case, without disclosing anything else. Referring to Section 5, 
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we distinguish between property ( v ), which allows Peggy to convince Vic that she 
can open two blobs to show the same bit (provided this is the case), and property 
(vi ), which allows Peggy to convince Vic that she can open two blobs to show 
different bits (provided this is the case). 
Several specific implementations of blobs given above (Sections 6.1.I, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 
and 6.2.1) allow property ( v) to be obtained as a primitive operation. Consider the 
blobs of Section 6.1.1 or 6.2.1, for instance. If x = y 2 sh( mod n) and .f = j 2 sh( mod n) 
for the same bit b, then if Peggy computes z = yysb mod n and gives it to Vic, will 
be convinced that she can open x and x to show the same bit after checking that 
xx = z2 (mod n ). However, if we use a general probabilistic encryption scheme to 
implement blobs (Section 3.2.3), it is not obvious that property (v) is always so easy 
to obtain. We challenge the reader to figure out how blob equality can be achieved 
with oblivious transfer blobs. 
Although property (vi) is also easy to implement as a primitive operation with 
the blobs of Sections 6.1.1, 6.1.2, and 6.2.1, it is intriguing to note that this does not 
seem to be so with the blobs based on graph isomorphism (Section 6.1.3 ). This 
shows that there is a fundamental difference between properties (v) and (vi): it is 
easy for Peggy to convince Vic that she knows an isomorphism between two graphs 
when this is so, but how could she convince him that she does not know such an 
isomorphism? (Notice that this question has nothing to do with whether or not 
graph non-isomorphism is in NP.) 
Even though they may not always be achieved as primitive operations, it turns 
out that properties (v) and (vi) can always be obtained through an interactive sub-
protocol. For simplicity, let us assume for the moment that our blobs are described 
by sets of integers X and Y, and by a verification function v, as in Sections 6.1 and 
6.2 (we thus temporarily rule out oblivious transfer blobs, quantum blobs, and 
multi-party blobs). Ivan Damgard has pointed out that the basic protocol of Sec-
tion 2 can be used for this purpose. Assume, for instance, that Peggy can open 
blobs x and .f to show the same bit and that she would give Vic y and y if she 
wanted to open these blobs. Instead of showing y and j, she uses the basic protocol 
to convince Vic that she knows y and y such that v(x, y) = v(x, j) E { 0, 1 }, which 
is an NP statement! 
It is interesting to note that any bit-commitment scheme can be transformed into 
one that also has properties (v) and (vi): it is enough to assume the abstract 
defining blob properties (i) through (iv). This can be achieved by an extension of 
an idea first suggested by Charles H. Bennett. The construction will be described in 
the forthcoming paper on quantum cryptography [BB3]. 
For blobs that already offer property (v) as a primitive, but not property (vi) 
(such as the blobs based on graph isomorphism of Section 6.1.3 ), it is more efficient 
to implement property (vi) through a subprotocol that makes use of property (v). 
Let x and .f be two blobs that Peggy can open to show distinct bits. To convince 
Vic of this fact, Peggy commits to two more blobs z and z, claiming that she can 
open them to show distinct bits. At this point, Vic issues one of two possible 
challenges. As a result, Peggy must either open both z and z, thus showing a 0 and 
184 BRASSARD. CHAUM, AND CREPEAU 
a J. or she must use property (v) twice to convince Vic of the equivalence between 
x and : (or :. whichever is the case) and the equivalence between x and z (or z ). 
If the above is repeated k times and, in fact, she could only open x and x to show 
the same bit. Peggy has only a probability 2 - k of successful cheating. 
The reverse process is obvious: if Peggy knows how to convince Vic that she can 
open two given blobs to show distinct bits when this is so, and if she wishes to con-
vince him that she can open blobs x and x to show the same bit, she simply com-
mits to an appropriate blob x'; then she convinces him, using property (vi), that 
she could open x and x' to show distinct bits and that she could also open x and 
x' to show distinct bits. 
6.6. Multivalued Blobs 
Consider any finite set D. The notion of bit commitment generalizes naturally to 
that of commitment to an arbitrary member of D. If D contains k elements, the 
effect of such a commitment could obviously be obtained through commitments to 
log 2 k ordinary blobs. However, it would be more interesting from an efficiency 
point of view if this could be achieved by committing to a single "multivalued 
blob." 
In the context of our basic protocol from Section 2, truth table entries are never 
opened in isolation. Whenever Peggy opens one such entry, she always opens the 
entire row containing it. We can therefore speed up the entire basic protocol nearly 
threefold if each blob can be opened in 8 different ways-corresponding to each 
possible choice of three bits in a truth table row. Of course, this idea is interesting 
only if the commitment to and opening of multivalued blobs are not substantially 
more expensive than the corresponding operations on binary blobs. 
Some of our previously discussed implementations extend easily to multivalued 
blobs. This is the case for both implementations based on the discrete logarithm 
(Sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2). In order to generalize the blobs of Section 6.1.2, Vic gives 
Peggy k distinct values s 1 , s2 , ••• , s k in 7l.; at the outset of the protocol (each s; i= 1 ). 
In order to commit to the ith element of D, Peggy chooses a random integer y, 
0 ~ y ~ p- 2 and computes the blob x = s;cx ,. mod p. The protocol of [CEG] is in 
order if it is desirable that Vic convince Peggy that he knows the logarithms of all 
these s;'s--either to obtain chameleon blobs or to remove the requirement that the 
factoring of p - 1 be known (as discussed at the end of Section 6.1.2 ). 
The blobs of Section 6.2.2 generalize easily, because the log log p successive 
higher-order bits after the uth least significant bit of a discrete logarithm are 
simultaneously as secure as the uth least significant bit alone [Pe]. Using these 
bits, (log p )-valued blobs can be realized. 
7. ls IT BETTER TO TRUST THE PROVER OR THE VERIFIER? 
"Cheating" takes on different meanings, according to whether one is talking 
about Peggy or about Vic. For Vic to cheat means that he learns something beyond 
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the fact that Peggy has access to the information she claims to have. Perhaps he did 
not quite obtain the Hamiltonian circuit he is desperately seeking, for instance, but 
he learned enough to drastically reduce his search. On the other hand, for Peggy 
to cheat means that she succeeds in convincing Vic that she has information that 
would pass the certifying procedure, when in fact she does not. 
It is also interesting to distinguish between lucky and daring successful cheating. 
The former refers to Peggy or Vic figuring out---against all odds--a piece of infor-
mation that will enable him/her to quietly go about his/her cheating with the 
certainty of being successful and undetected. The latter refers to Peggy or Vic 
making an illegal move that is almost certainly going to result in his/her cheating 
being detected at some point in the future, but that might nonetheless, with an 
exponentially small probability, allow him/her to succeed. Finally, cheating may be 
called retroactiue (or of.fline) if it can take place some time after the protocol is 
completed, by looking back at its transcript; it is real-time (or on-line) if it must be 
completed while the protocol is taking place. 
If the blobs of Section 6.2 are used (corresponding to the protocols previously 
given by [ G MW, BC I]), Peggy could never participate with peace of mind: an 
algorithmic breakthrough might allow Vic to cheat retroactively, even if the new 
algorithm is not fast enough for a real-time response. Even if the cryptographic 
assumption turns out to be well founded, Vic still has a (very slight) probability of 
lucky (hence undetectable) cheating. On the other hand, regardless of any assump-
tions, the only cheating Peggy could attempt would be of the daring kind. 
By contrast, if the blobs of Section 6.1.1 are used (corresponding to the protocols 
previously given in [Ch4, BC2] ), the only way Vic can hope to learn anything 
about Peggy's secret is to be daring right from the beginning and to choose a 
quadratic non-residue as his s. He would almost certainly get caught by Peggy 
while trying to convince her that s is a quadratic residue, but would, if successful, 
be capable of distinguishing blobs used by Peggy as commitments to 0 from those 
used for 1. Asking Vic to disclose a square root of s at the end of the protocol 
(which is not detrimental to him at that point, assuming he is honest) provides 
Peggy with certainty that Vic has not learned any of her secrets (and never will 
retroactively). If the blobs of Section 6.1.2 are used, even this unlikely opportunity 
for daring cheating is not available to Vic. On the other hand, with the implementa-
tions of Section 6.1, Vic's belief that Peggy cannot cheat depends on his belief in the 
appropriate cryptographic assumption. With the implementation of Section 6.1.1, 
for instance, Peggy could "open" any quadratic residue as either 0 or l, whichever 
suits her best, if she could only obtain a square root of s before the end of the 
first round in which she is asked a challenge she is not otherwise prepared to 
answer. (Obtaining this square root at any later time would be of no use to her.) 
Moreover, even if the cryptographic assumption is well founded, Peggy still has a 
(very slight) possibility of breaking it by luck, but she must be daring to suggest 
conducting the protocol in the hope that she will be so lucky. Finally, retroactive 
cheating is meaningless for either party in this context. An algorithm capable of 
factoring in two weeks, for instance, would spell doom to the protocol if blobs were 
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implemented as in Section 6.2.1, but it would be of no immediate consequence with 
the blobs of Section 6.1.1. 
If blobs unconditionally secure for Peggy are used (Section 6.1 ), additional 
security for Vic is obtained by asking Peggy to repeat the entire protocol with a 
different type of blob each time (as pointed out originally in [Ch4] ). In order to 
cheat, Peggy would then have to be capable of breaking several different crypto-
graphic assumptions. For instance, she would need efficient on-line algorithms both 
for factoring and for extracting discrete logarithms. Curiously, the opposite effect is 
obtained with the blobs that are unconditionally secure for Vic (Section 6.2): 
repeating the protocol with different types of blobs would only make it easier for 
Vic to cheat, since he can do so by breaking (possibly off-line) any one of the 
underlying cryptographic assumptions. Nonetheless, increased security can be 
obtained if several types of blobs unconditionally secure for Vic are combined in a 
different way: each time Peggy wishes to commit to some bit h, she commits to one 
blob of each type at random except that h is the exclusive-or of the corresponding 
bits. Naturally, using this strategy with blobs unconditionally secure for Peggy 
would only make it easier for her to cheat. 
Is it preferable to trust Vic or Peggy? We do not know, but it sure is nice to have 
the choice! Finally, consider the following provocative situation: suppose that 
Peggy claims to have proven Theorem T and she uses the blobs of Section 6.1.1 to 
convince a skeptical Vic of this. At the end of the protocol, regardless of any 
unproved assumptions, Vic will be convinced that Peggy has either a proof of T or 
hot results on integer factoring! In particular, no assumptions are needed if T's 
claim is: "I have an efficient factoring algorithm .... " 
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